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Abstract 
Western Europe and the United States have both seen an increase in the number of elected 
officials who represent the far-right ideologically. In this paper, I investigate the reasons behind 
the rise of far-right nationalist parties, as well as the impacts it has on policy and implications for 
international relations. To do this, I compared recent election results from Western Europe and 
the US, the populist rhetoric used by these parties and their candidates, and the subsequent 
changes in immigration and trade policy due to far-right politicians enacting their agenda. Through 
this comparison, I concluded first that the elections in Western Europe show a shift in favoring 
far-right nationalist parties, while in the US, the Republican Party as a whole has shifted further 
to the right due to the Tea Party movement. Western Europe’s populist rhetoric targets asylum-
seekers, while in the US the rhetoric is largely anti-Latino in addition to being anti-Muslim. Both 
regions have their respective anti-establishment elements as well. For policy results, we see this 
shift in far-right nationalism manifest in stringent immigration and asylum laws, specifically in 
France and Austria, as well as Britain leaving the EU in 2016. For the US, the border wall, 
repealing DACA, the travel ban, and pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership are all examples 
of Trump carrying out a far-right nationalist agenda. Through this comparison, I conclude that 
there is a global trend shifting away from a globalist, neoliberal world to a more protectionist, 
nationalist world. This trend will have impacts on the movement of people and goods across the 
globe.  
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Introduction 
 A political phenomenon has been taking place across many parts of the globe, especially 
among Western societies. The phenomenon is a large increase in support for far-right nationalist 
parties and politicians across Western Europe and the United States. Voters are electing a new 
crop of politicians to represent them, and they have a very different platform and agenda 
compared to their predecessors. The US has elected a president publicly endorsed by far-right 
political groups, white nationalists, and neo-Nazis (Oppenheim 2017), while some European 
nations have seen as much as 35% of their Parliament replaced by far-right members (BBC 2016), 
but why? Understanding this shift in the political climate throughout Western Europe and the 
United States has implications not only for domestic national policies, but for the international 
arena as well. The research question that I hope to answer through this paper is: Why is far-right 
nationalism on the rise in Western societies, and how are the causes and effects of this rise similar 
or different between Western Europe and the United States?  
To answer this question, I will compare the changing election patterns across Western 
Europe and US that illustrate an increased favorability towards far-right nationalist candidates, 
the rhetoric used by these candidates and their parties, and policy outcomes that have resulted 
from this surge in nationalism. I will begin by providing a brief background on the issue, definitions 
of important concepts, and an explanation of my method and comparison criteria. Next I will 
examine the Western European case—election results and the realignment of political party 
strengths, rhetoric used by far-right parties and their members, and subsequent policy changes. 
I will then do the same for the case of the United States. After examining the Western European 
and US cases, I will provide an analysis of the similarities and differences between the two, as 
well as posit some implications for what this may mean in the context of international relations. 
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Background, Definitions, and Method 
 While many European and US ethno-nationalist groups have been around for decades, a 
new salience has appeared around these party’s beliefs. This newfound popularity can be 
attributed to opposition to neoliberalism and demographic changes, anxieties associated with 
terrorism, and perceived corruption or non-representativeness of the EU and US governance 
systems (Pazzanese 2017). All of these things have generated some level of anxiety among 
particularly white, native-born populations and a perceived status loss amongst them, which then 
makes both nationalist and populist claims—and especially nationalist-populist claims—more 
resonant and more salient than they had been in the past. Fueled by skepticism of the political 
elite and opposition to immigration and globalization, far-right political parties are gaining support 
across Europe and the United States.  
 To fully understand the causes, effects, and implications of a rise in far-right nationalism, 
there are a few key concepts that must be defined. The first is nationalism, and in particular, 
ethno-nationalism. Unlike liberal or civic nationalism, which considers all people who live within a 
country’s borders as part of the nation regardless of their ethnic, racial, or religious origins, ethno-
nationalism is defined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, faith, 
and ethnic ancestry (Muller 2008). When modern states began to form in Europe after World War 
II, political boundaries largely coincided with the respective ethnolinguistic boundaries of Western 
Europe. For substantial stretches of US history, only people of English origin, or those who were 
Protestant, white, or hailed from northern Europe were believed to be true Americans. When 
referring to nationalism in this paper, I am referring to the shared ethno-nationalist identity among 
members of each respective nation-state that draws a distinction between a cohesive “us” and an 
identifiable “them.” This “us/them” dichotomy is what right-wing populist parties draw upon to 
construct distinct boundaries and create “Otherness.”  
 The concepts of populism and right-wing populism are also important to define for the 
purpose of this paper. The central narrative of populism is the juxtaposition of a corrupt political 
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class, elite, or establishment against “the people,” whose sole authentic voice the populist party 
claims to defend (Greven 2016). Modern right-wing populism adds a second antagonism of “us 
versus them” to this narrative, as well as employs tactics of negative political communication such 
as a blatant rejection of political correctness, and the use of emotional appeals and personal 
insults. Based on each country’s respective definition of “the people” as culturally homogenous, 
right-wing populists juxtapose their national identity and common interests with the identity and 
interests of “others,” usually minorities such as migrants and asylum seekers, who are supposedly 
favored by the corrupt elites. Other tenants of modern far-right populism include favoring 
protectionist policies as opposed to neoliberal policies, xenophobia over tolerance of 
multiculturalism, and traditional values over progressive values (Inglehart and Norris 2016). When 
far-right populist parties employ tactics that draw on ethno-nationalist sentiments, the result is the 
phenomenon of modern far-right nationalism.  
 To compare the rise of far-right nationalism in Western Europe and the United States, I 
will be utilizing the comparative case study method using three criteria of comparison. A 
comparative case study analyzes and synthesizes the similarities, differences and patterns across 
two or more cases that share a common focus or goal in a way that produces knowledge that is 
easier to generalize about causal questions. The first criteria is comparing the measurable 
phenomenon itself—the election of right-wing candidates and the realignment of political party 
strengths—in order to see the respective rise in the prevalence of nationalism across both 
regions. Next is comparing the cause of this phenomenon, which I argue is due to the populist 
rhetoric of far-right political parties resonating with the disenfranchised members of the population 
who view their elevated status in society as threatened. Lastly, I will compare the impact of this 
phenomenon—the policy changes that have occurred as a result of the rise of far-right 
nationalism. These comparisons will hopefully result in new and meaningful insights into the 
causes, effects, and impacts of the rise in far-right nationalism across Western Europe and the 
United States. 
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The Case of Western Europe 
 Amid a migrant crisis, sluggish economic growth, and growing disillusionment with the 
European Union, far-right parties—some long standing, others newly formed—have been 
achieving electoral success in a number of European nations (New York Times 2016). The 2016 
elections were quite telling, and unveiled this paradigm shift across Europe. The Netherlands’ 
anti-European Union, anti-Islam “Party for Freedom,” Greece’s neo-fascist party “Golden Dawn,” 
Hungary’s anti-immigration and economic protectionist party “Jobbik,” and Slovakia’s anti-Roma 
party “Our Slovakia” are only a few examples of far-right parties that have achieved significant 
electoral success within the last two years. Even in Germany, where shame over the Nazis has 
long provided resistance to the pull of nationalism, the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 
has broken into the mainstream. Combining euroscepticism with a conservative social issue 
agenda, the AfD mainly capitalized on the neglecting of these matters by the liberal party and the 
Christian democrats, and now has representation in 10 of the country’s 16 state parliaments 
(Shuster, 2016).  
Many political observers view Marine Le Pen's National Front (FN) as the biggest 
nationalist challenge to Europe's liberal democratic traditions. The FN was established in 1972, 
and its founders and sympathizers included former Nazi collaborators and members of the 
wartime collaborationist Vichy regime (New York Times 2016). The FN won 6.8 million votes in 
regional elections in 2015, but lost in two target regions after the Socialists pulled out and urged 
supporters to back Nicolas Sarkozy's conservatives (BBC 2016). Le Pen received 34% of the vote 
for president in 2017, twice as much as her father received in 2002. Her anti-globalization platform 
was popular in places where deindustrialization has driven high poverty and unemployment (Aisch 
2017). 
 Austria’s Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) or Freedom Party has also recently gained 
prominence. The party was founded in 1955, and promotes an anti-EU and anti-immigrant agenda 
(Graven 2016). The FPÖ candidate Norbert Hofer emerged as the clear front-runner in the first 
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round of the 2016 presidential election, garnering 35% of the vote (New York Times 2016). He 
lost in the first runoff against Alexander Van der Bellen, an economics professor and former Green 
Party leader, by only 0.6 percentage points or 30,000 votes. The party challenged the results of 
the presidential runoff election, citing “numerous irregularities and failures” in the counting of 
votes. After a repeat of the runoff election, Van der Bellen won a decisive victory by 6.6 
percentage points. Hofer had campaigned on strengthening the country’s borders and its army, 
limiting benefits for immigrants, and favoring Austrians in the job market. On the social front, one 
of the party’s policy points is “Yes to families rather than gender madness.” The FPÖ, whose 
motto is “Austria first,” currently holds 40 of the 183 seats in the National Council. 
 There are several right-wing populist actors who have changed the political landscape and 
influenced policies with limited electoral support. In the United Kingdom, the UK Independence 
Party (UKIP), founded in 1993, has been consistent in its anti-EU and anti-immigration message 
and is now profiting from changed public opinion (Greven 2016). Under the leadership of Nigel 
Farage, UKIP saw its biggest successes at the elections for the European parliament in 2014, 
receiving 27.5% of all votes cast and polling at 15% for support nationally (Goodwin 2015). The 
UKIP’s greatest impact on European politics was the success of the “leave” campaign that lead 
to Britain leaving the European union in June of 2016. The “Brexit” was driven in large part by the 
anti-immigrant rhetoric of the UKIP, which has long called for Britain to close its borders (Shuster 
2016). UKIP’s poll ratings peaked in June 2016 at 16%, but since the “leave” campaign’s success, 
has steadily declined and was at a mere 4% going into the 2017 general election (NewStatesman 
2017).  
The rhetoric that led to “Brexit” is similar to the rhetoric used by other far-right populist 
parties in that it aimed to insight anti-immigrant sentiments among the native population. The 
British public seemed unconvinced that life without the EU would make them freer or more 
prosperous. Academics were attacking the economic argument for leaving the EU, making stark 
warnings of a downturn if the UK pulled out. Then, the "leave" campaign shifted its focus to 
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immigration—specifically, how to bring it to a screeching halt. Polling had revealed that 
immigration was a key concern for many who were thinking of voting to leave the EU. Nearly 75% 
of prospective "leave" voters cited immigration as the most important issue in the referendum, at 
a time when migrants were coming to the UK at near-record levels (Hall 2016). The campaign 
arrived full-force in the form of a poster showing thousands of refugees crossing the Croatia-
Slovenia border last year. The words "BREAKING POINT" were emblazoned across the picture, 
above a line that read: "We must break free of the EU and take back control of our borders." UKIP 
party leader Nigel Farage defended it, saying its purpose “was to say that Europe isn't working.” 
He added, “Something that's true can't be a scare” (Hall 2016).  
Anti-immigrant rhetoric is consistent throughout prominent far-right party leaders. Geert 
Wilders, a Dutch far-right politician and founder of the Party for Freedom, claimed that “the failure 
to defend our own culture has turned immigration into the most dangerous threat that can be used 
against the West. Multiculturalism has made us so tolerant that we tolerate the intolerant. If 
Europe falls… it will fall because it foolishly believes that all cultures are equal and that, 
consequently, there is no reason why we should fight for our own culture in order to preserve it” 
(Wodak 2015). For France in particular, the Islamist attacks on Paris in January and November 
of 2015, in which nearly 150 people were murdered, raised alarm about jihadists taking advantage 
of Europe's open borders. When FN candidate Marine Le Pen announced her candidacy for 
president, she showed no sign of moderating her rhetoric as she claimed France was under the 
threat of two “totalitarianisms”—economic globalization and Islamic fundamentalism. Le Pen 
claimed that mass immigration caused by globalization left French people feeling “dispossessed” 
of their own country and allowed Islamic fundamentalism to settle on its territory (Farand 2017). 
She sighted prayers in the streets and the veil worn by Muslim women as threats to France’s 
culture and values and that “no French person, no Republican and no women attached to their 
dignity could accept it.” Supposedly running in the name of the people, Marine Le Pen reaffirmed 
the FN’s anti-immigration, protectionist, anti-European Union and populist stance.  
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Despite Le Pen losing the presidency to Emmanuel Macron, the French National 
Assembly has passed a tough new immigration law that tightens the rules around asylum. The 
bill, passing by 228 votes to 139 with 24 abstentions, shortens asylum application deadlines, 
doubles the time for which illegal migrants can be detained, and introduces a one-year prison 
sentence for entering France illegally (BBC 2018). The deadline for filing asylum applications or 
appealing against a rejection have also changed, with claimants having 90 days to file an 
application as opposed to 120, and only two weeks to appeal against rejection. France’s 
governing centrist party says the bill will speed up the process of claiming asylum, but opponents 
complained that migrants were being treated like criminals. The bill passed the French National 
Assembly on April 23, 2018, and will now be debated in the upper house in June. 
France isn’t the only country passing stringent immigration laws. Austria passed one of 
the most restrictive immigration bills in Europe in December of 2017. Heinz-Christian Strache, 
chairman of the Freedom Party (FPÖ), agreed to a deal from Austria’s Chancellor Sebastian 
Kurz’s to state unequivocally that Austria would not try to secede from the EU or drop the euro 
and subscribe to traditional center-right policies like keeping down the national debt. In exchange 
for going along with Kurz on the economy and on Europe, he received the foreign minister's post, 
meaning the Freedom Party now has an exclusive hold on immigration policy (Bershidsky 2017). 
The legislation that emerged as a result of this deal draws a clear line between immigration and 
asylum. The former is supposed to be merit-based, in line with Austria's labor market needs, while 
asylum rights are inscribed in international law. Asylum seekers should now be prepared to give 
up their mobile phones for analysis to determine their travel routes and, where necessary, their 
identity. If a positive identification can't be made, as was the case with many new arrivals during 
the 2015-2016 refugee crisis, the new government intends to refuse asylum. It also plans to 
confiscate any cash asylum-seekers might be carrying and put it toward the cost of their 
settlement. Any help they receive should only be in kind. Individual accommodations should be 
ruled out, and medical confidentiality should be waived for diseases deemed important for the 
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settlement process. Any asylum seekers convicted of crimes are to be deported, and deportation 
appeals procedures are generally to be curtailed. 
The government program contains a special subchapter on fighting "political Islam," 
defined as the rejection of Austrian values and social norms in favor of secular "Islamization" of 
society. It includes a ban on foreign funding for religious organizations and strict control over the 
curriculum of Islamic schools and kindergartens, as well as what's being preached in mosques 
(Bershidsky 2017). Only time will tell what the result of this legislation will be. Time has already 
shown some results of the “Brexit” referendum of 2016. As mentioned earlier, “Brexit” was driven 
in large part by the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the UKIP, but the impact of the referendum is largely 
economic. The actual event of Britain exiting the EU is likely to occur in early 2019. Leaving the 
EU will mean withdrawing from the EU’s supranational political institutions and will lead to the 
erection of new barriers to the exchange of goods, services, and people with the remaining 27 
member states (Sampson 2017). More broadly, Brexit raises questions about the future stability 
of the EU and the extent to which further globalization is inevitable. The main conclusion drawn 
by Sampson and other scholars is that Brexit will make the United Kingdom poorer than it would 
otherwise have been because it will lead to new barriers to trade and migration between the UK 
and the European Union. There is considerable uncertainty over how large the costs of Brexit will 
be, with plausible estimates ranging between 1 and 10 percent of UK per capita income. However, 
the social impacts of Brexit were quickly apparent, with hate crimes surging by 42% in England 
and Wales immediately following the vote (Stone 2016). A total of 3,076 incidents were recorded 
across the country between June 16th and June 30th. 
When investigating the case of Western Europe, we see that various far-right parties with 
similar founding principles have gained prominence in recent elections, likely due to their right-
wing populist rhetoric resonating with certain white, ethno-nationalist populations. The result has 
been in increase in extreme immigration policy across the board, as well as anti-globalization 
efforts in the form of Britain leaving the EU. I will now lay out the case of the United States, and 
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then compare the two on the basis of their elections, rhetoric, and policy in regards to rising 
nationalism.  
 
The Case of the United States 
 The American two party system with its winner-take all elections has been mostly immune 
to third party challenges, at least since today’s Republican party replaced the Whig Party in the 
1860s. The Populist Party of the 1890s was successful in influencing the national agenda, but 
was subsequently absorbed into the Democratic Party, moving the party further to the left. As 
Donald Trump has risen in popularity among the Republican party, right-wing populism has taken 
hold of the US in the modern age. Intra-party populism is not a new phenomenon; in fact, the 
Republican party has for decades more or less embraced tenets of the “us versus them” narrative. 
This alone did not make the Republican Party a populist party. However, the rise of the Tea Party 
movement, embittered with the Obama presidency, alleged bail-outs of African-American and 
Latino debtors, the national debt, Obamacare, and the Republican establishment, have 
profoundly changed the American political landscape in a populist fashion (Greven 2016). 
Data from the 2016 American National Election Study allows us to offer a multifaceted 
profile of white voters who voted for Donald Trump. While demographics are an element, voting 
in the 2016 election was more immediately and decisively associated with attitudes than with 
demographics (Smith and Hanley 2018). The decisive reason that white, male, older, and less 
educated voters were disproportionately pro-Trump is that they shared his prejudices and wanted 
domineering, aggressive leaders more often than other voters did. There were eight attitudes 
found that predict Trump support: conservative identification; support for domineering leaders; 
fundamentalism; prejudice against immigrants, African Americans, Muslims, and women; and 
pessimism about the economy (Smith and Hanley 2018). Overall, what we see is that a spectrum 
of attitudes inspired pro-Trump voting, and that many of these attitudes are particularly common 
among older, less educated, and male voters.  
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Trump owes his success to the fact that he tailored his rhetoric to the wishes of these 
voters. At the outset of the Republican primaries there were 17 candidates, none of which 
sounded anything like Trump. Not one promised to stifle dissent, crush evil, build walls, or ban 
Muslim immigrants with anything resembling Trump’s hubris. Republican voters, choosing 
between a paradigm-shifting candidate and a cast of extras, chose the candidate that promised 
to “Make America Great Again.” The factor that solidified that choice was a preference for a 
domineering and intolerant leader who would put their prejudices into practice. Strong Trump 
supporters are significantly more likely than others to allege anti-white discrimination. The wish 
for a domineering and impolitic leader coalesces here with the wish for a reversal of what his base 
perceives as an inverted moral and racial order (Smith and Hanley 2018). 
The rhetoric that resonated with Trump voters, as stated earlier, was populist in nature 
and drew on anti-immigrant and anti-establishment sentiments. One of the most memorable 
quotes from Donald Trump came when he announced his run for the Republican nomination for 
president in June of 2015—setting the tone for an unpredictable and polarizing campaign. “When 
Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best [...] They're sending people that have lots 
of problems, and they're bringing those problems with them. They're bringing drugs. They're 
bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people" (Newsday 2016). Donald 
Trump's appeal to fascist ideology and policy considerations took a more blatant and dangerous 
turn when he released a statement calling for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering 
the United States” (Giroux 2016). Trump qualified his racist appeal to voters' fears by stating that 
such a ban is necessary “until our country's representatives can figure out what is going on,” 
referring to the influx of refugees from Africa and the Middle East. This comment was followed up 
by Trump telling CNN’s Anderson Cooper that he thinks Islam “hates us” when asked if he thinks 
Islam is at war with the West (Newsday 2016). 
 This rhetoric has resonated with white supremacist, fascist, and neo-Nazi groups within 
the US. David Duke, former KKK grand wizard, spoke out at the alt-right and neo-Nazi rally in 
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Charlottesville, Virginia in August of 2017. “We are determined to take our country back,” Duke 
said, calling it a “turning point.” “We are going to fulfill the promises of Donald Trump. That’s what 
we believed in. That’s why we voted for Donald Trump, because he said he’s going to take our 
country back” (Nelson 2017). Trump’s lack of condemnation of these white supremacist rallies 
has been critiqued as support for their message and pandering to the extreme wing of his base 
(O’Brien 2017). The casual racism, sexism, and xenophobia that Trump has embedded into his 
vocabulary has further contributed to the polarizing divide of the American people and the 
legitimization of extreme alt-right and white supremacist groups. This isn’t the only type of rhetoric 
that he has employed. His anti-establishment rhetoric has resonated with the less extreme wing 
of his base, appealing to the former blue-collar middle class and disenfranchised sectors of the 
population. Trump set himself apart by being an outsider, promising to “drain the swamp” of the 
political elite in Washington, and to put “America first” (Overby 2017).  This nationalist-populist 
rhetoric is a large contributor to Trump’s victory in the 2016 election, and has manifested itself in 
new immigration and economic policy.  
 Policies that have arisen after the advent of Donald Trump include the Mexico border wall, 
repealing of DACA, the travel ban, and pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Congress has 
approved $1.6 billion for 100 miles of new and replacement border wall, but has not approved 
funding for Trump’s proposed 2,000 mile wall (Allyn 2018). He tweeted in September of 2017 that 
the wall was already under construction in the form of new renovations to old and existing fences, 
and will continue to be built. Customs and Border Patrol unveiled eight prototypes of various 
materials that President Trump visited in March. He will supposedly pick the one he likes best. 
The total cost of the border wall is estimated to be $25 billion dollars, and it doesn’t look like 
Mexico is going to pay for it (Mark 2018).  
Another agenda item that targets Latino immigration is the Republicans’ push to repeal 
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. The DACA program was formed 
through executive action by former President Barack Obama in 2012 and allowed minors who 
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came to the US illegally to be protected from immediate deportation. While DACA protects 
unauthorized immigrants from all over the world, 79.4% of recipients are from Mexico, and 94% 
are from Mexico or Central or South America (Lopez and Krogstad 2017). Trump has proposed 
to phase out the program, and the U.S. government is not accepting new DACA applications and 
stopped accepting renewal applications in October. Late last year, Trump and top Democrats 
were reportedly working together to stop these “dreamers” from being deported, however, a group 
of Republicans are making good on their threat to attempt to force an immigration floor vote in the 
House. Early in May of 2018, a discharge petition—a procedural maneuver that can bring 
legislation to the House floor if it is signed by a majority of House members regardless of whether 
it has moved through committee—began garnering signatures. If the petition were to pick up 
enough supporters, it would set up a floor debate on four different immigration measures as early 
as June (Kopan 2018). 
Further related to immigration, Trump enacted his travel ban executive order under the 
caption, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” The order 
banned entry into the United States of nationals from seven countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen (Moore 2017). When Trump first 
proposed a Muslim ban in 2015, there was backlash from the legal community. Rudy Giuliani 
warned him that a global ban based on religion would be overturned by the federal courts on 
constitutional grounds. However, a regional ban, based on the concept of imminent danger to the 
US rather than on religious affiliation, would withstand constitutional scrutiny. The problem with 
the "imminent danger” defense is that there is no causal relation between the danger posed by 
nationals from these banned countries and the incidents of so-called Islamic terrorism in the 
United States (Moore 2017). The president signed the executive order on January 27th, with 
nationwide protests beginning January 28th. Despite numerous judges in multiple states blocking 
parts of the order, Trump continued to promise a new and improved travel ban to circumvent 
judicial opposition (Almasy and Simon 2017). 
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On the trade and globalization front, Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) by executive order in one of his first acts as president. In a memorandum 
written to the United States Trade Representative, President Trump stated that it was his intention 
to deal “directly with individual countries on a one­ on ­one (or bilateral) basis in negotiating future 
trade deals” (Trump 2017). The rationale for doing so was to promote American industry, protect 
American workers, and raise American wages. Trump signaled his readiness to reopen trade talks 
if he could get a "better deal" for the United States (Fernandez 2018). TPP is only one example 
of new protectionist policies to come out of the Trump Administration.  
When investigating the case of the United States, we see that the Republican party has 
gained the support of vocally far-right, white nationalist, and extremist groups. We also see that 
besides these groups, those who voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 elections shared, above all 
else, his prejudices, and were mostly from the older, white, male demographic. Trump’s far-right 
populist rhetoric resonated with these groups, and with Trump’s election, has resulted in new 
immigration and economic policy. I will now compare and contrast the case of the United States 
with that of Western Europe.  
 
Discussion: Comparison and Analysis 
 After explaining the cases of Western Europe and the United States in regards to the rise 
of far-right nationalism, many comparisons can be drawn. First, for elections, Western Europe 
showed an increased favorability of far-right nationalist parties, while in the US, there was 
increased favorability for the Republican Party which has shifted further to the right due to the 
Tea Party and other populist movements. Since the US has the two-party system, it is more 
difficult to compare the rise in “political parties” between the United States and Europe. We can 
say that both cases showed a new salience around the far-right stance on immigration and the 
economy, calling for immigration reform and protectionist policies. However, comparing the 
demographics of who voted for far-right politicians would shed more light on the similarities and 
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differences between elections. The demographics of those who voted for these candidates differ 
slightly in some respects.  
While Trump voters were more likely to be older, those who voted for Marine Le Pen and 
the National Front were much younger. She received almost half of the 18-24 year old vote, and 
only 20% of the vote from those 65 and older (Kentish 2017). This shows that there may be a 
generational gap between the far-right nationalists of Europe versus those in the US. Additionally, 
though Trump claimed to represent working-class citizens and the middle class, Trump voters 
had above-average wages, low exposure to immigrant workers, and under 10% of them work in 
production (Smith and Hanley 2018). In contrast, Marine Le Pen secured the vote of 63% of 
manual workers (Kentish 2017). Austria’s Norbert Hofer was also almost fully supported by 
manual workers, receiving 90% of their vote (BBC 2016). Though demographics differ in certain 
areas, the most consistent demographic to vote for these candidates were white males and 
manual workers across both regions. Only after writing my paper did I discover that the 
comparison of elections would be improved if I focused more on the demographics of both regions 
rather than characterizing the parties themselves. Further research could explicitly compare the 
voter demographics of far-right supporters across Europe and the United States. 
Other evaluations can be made when comparing why these candidates were favored. Both 
European and US candidates utilized populist rhetoric that resonated with a part of the population 
that felt disenfranchised and forgotten. This rhetoric was anti-immigrant, anti-establishment, and 
anti-globalization in nature. In Europe, this rhetoric mostly targeted asylum-seekers and was 
sparked by the refugee crisis of 2015. In the United States, the most prevalent anti-immigrant 
rhetoric targeted those from the Latino community, and mostly those from Mexico specifically. 
However, both regions experienced anti-Muslim rhetoric from right-wing politicians, both 
appealing to citizens’ fears of terrorism and Islamization. Both regions utilized similar phrases to 
draw upon nationalist sentiments on immigration. The notion that “the people” had to “take back” 
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their country from outsiders was seen across the board; most explicitly in Britain’s “leave” 
campaign, but also within Marine Le Pen and Donald Trump’s rhetoric.  
Anti-establishment rhetoric manifested in Western Europe as anti-European Union, while 
in the US it is focused on Washington and the federal government. We do not see the same level 
of disdain for the federal government of European nations. Trump’s promise to “drain the swamp” 
and lock Hillary Clinton up appeased those voters who were tired of the D.C. elite. Anti-
globalization rhetoric wasn’t as prevalent in Western Europe as it was in the US. Trump’s slogan 
was “Make America Great Again,” and he proposed he would do so by putting America first. 
Austria’s Freedom party did have an “Austria First” motto, however, this is not as prevalent across 
all of Western Europe. It seems that both regions utilize far-right populist rhetoric in the same 
ways, but tailor their message to fit their people, culture, and circumstance.  
The rhetoric spouted by far-right European and US politicians has materialized in new 
policies. In France and Austria, new stringent asylum laws were passed to keep out the foreigners 
that did not fit into their homogeneous culture. Both of these laws targeted refugees; the most 
vulnerable migrant population. Many of these refugees were Muslim, and anxieties about 
terrorism contributed to these harsh policies being enacted. In the US, both the borer wall and the 
rollback of DACA targeted Latino immigration. The rationale for Latino and Mexican based racism 
lies in the illegal drug and criminal narrative that Trump’s campaign upheld. The travel ban was 
enacted as a guise for a Muslim ban, and was also associated with anxieties over terrorism. 
Though the nature of these policies are different, it is fair to say that when right-wing politicians 
with nationalist agendas have power in government, the result is an increase in stringent 
immigration policies. 
Economic policies were also evaluated in this paper. The UKIP’s “leave” campaign and 
subsequent “Brexit” is a manifestation of anti-EU and anti-globalization sentiment in Western 
Europe. Though the vote was close, Nigel Farage and the UKIP managed to convince over 50% 
of the voters in the UK to agree to leave the European Union. The rhetoric used to achieve this 
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was populist and heavily anti-immigrant, though the impacts of this decision will largely be 
economic. Pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership was Trump’s way of protecting America’s 
interests and making it so the US is “winning” again. Pulling out of the Paris Agreement and 
enacting tariffs on China are just two other examples of economic protectionist policies from 
Trump’s agenda. The trend here is that both regions are looking inward economically, and are 
moving towards isolationism and protectionism.  
Overall, we see that both Western Europe and the US have elected more far-right 
nationalist leaders for many of the same reasons. The population that views themselves as the 
“rightful” occupants of each given country is opposed to an influx of immigrants, and they feel as 
if the previous administrations failed to address their concerns. Prejudice towards Muslims is seen 
throughout both regions, with anti-Latino prejudice permeating the United States. Politicians 
capitalized on these prejudices by tailoring their rhetoric to appeal to those who hold them. Once 
in power, these politicians enacted stringent immigration policies and economically protectionists 
policies to placate their base.  
With this rise in nationalism, both Western Europe and the United States have moved 
further to the right ideologically to be more in line with their respective ethno-nationalist trends. 
Besides lending legitimacy to white supremacist and white nationalist groups, and therefore 
inciting high levels of polarization within the populations of both regions domestically, this reveals 
a larger trend—a global shift away from globalization, neoliberalism, and cosmopolitanism, and 
towards protectionism, isolationism, and nationalism. With more and more nations favoring harsh 
immigration policies and economic protectionism, this shift will likely have severe impacts on the 
movement of people and goods across borders in the near future. The nature of foreign policy is 
likely to change. Further research should be done into how this shift towards nationalism will affect 
migrant populations and the global economy. 
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